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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDDIE I-IOOGLAND, 
by his guardian ad litem, 
Roelof Hoogland, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
THO~IAS B. CHILD and C. W. CHILD, 
dba THOMAS B. CHILD & CO.; 
JA·CK ALDER and ROBERT R. 
CHILD, dba ALDER-CHILD 
CONSTRUCTION CO., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9295 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS JACK ALDER AND 
ROBERT R. CHILD, dba ALDER CHILD 
CONSTRU,CTION COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF F A·CTS 
The plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment 
made and entered in favor of all of the defendants and 
against the plaintiff, no cause of action. ( R. 88) 
The record on appeal in this case consists of the 
pleadings and material contained in the appeal cover 
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and of the depositions of Eddie Hoogland, Roelof Hoog-
land and Louisa Hoogland, which are contained in a 
separate folder, and of the depositions of Robert R. Child 
and Thomas B. Child, \vhich are contained in another 
folder. Each of the three documents contains its own 
separate page numbering. Therefore, in our resume of 
the facts where the record is referred to we will use the 
letter "R"; where the Hoogland depositions are referred 
to we -vvill use the letter ''H," and \\7here the ·Child depo-
sitions are referred to we will use the letter "C." 
The incident out of which the plaintiff's injuries 
arose occurred on the 18th day of February, 1957, (R. 2). 
Thomas B. Child is the father of Robert R. Child, 
(C. 37) However, they lived in separate homes and con-
ducted separate businesses. Thomas B. Child \Yas a 
mason contractor. Robert R. Child \vas a partner with 
Jack Alder in the general construction business, doing 
business under the name and style of Alder-Child Con-
struction ~c·ompany, ( C 2, 3, 20). !Thomas B. Child resided 
at 452 South 8th East, and to the rear of his premises 
had a large lot on the south portion of \Yhich \Yere some 
statues and the north portion of \vhich was used as a 
storage yard in connection \vith his 1nason contracting 
business. 
The Alder-Child Company at that time did not have 
a yard in whieh to store its material and had stored some 
material on the premises of Thomas B. Child with his 
consent. The material included one or perhaps two 53 
gallon drums of Sealtex, a concrete curing compound 
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which they had used on practically all of their building 
jobs. There were no signs on the drum indicating that the 
product \vas explosive, dangerous or flammable, and they 
had never found it to be dangerous, explosive or flam-
rnable from their experience in using it, and had never 
heard of any incidents where it had been found to be 
flammable or dangerous, (R. 29-31; C. 4, 5). It had an 
asphalt smell but did not smell like Benzine, and did not 
give off fumes, (C. 6, 15). 
Robert R. Child in his deposition testified that he 
had never observed any holes in the fence surrounding 
his father's p.remises, (C.17, 18), and had never seen 
kids running through the yard or playing in it, (C. 19). 
Reference is made in appellant's Brief to the fact 
that Thomas B. ~c·hild stored dangerous acids upon his 
premises. If so, the answer to this is that the accident 
\Yas not caused by any contact with dangerous acid. 
At the time of the accident the plaintiff minor, Eddie 
Hoogland, was 14 years of age, (H. 3). He and his 
parents had lived in this country a little over 4 years, 
(H. 3). He "\Vas a student in the 7th grade at the Webster 
School and would have attended junior high school the 
next year, (H. 4). On the day of the accident he had 
sloughed at least a part of his school and in the afternoon 
had gone on to the premises of the O.P. Skaggs Store 
\vhich adjoins the Thomas B. Child property on the north, 
(H. 5). In order to get onto the Child premises he had to 
squeeze through a small place between a fence and a 
building, (H.11, 20, 21). The only reason he gave for 
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going on the premises was that he liked the place, "the 
rocks and that," (H. 10). He had gone on the premises 
before and played upon some machinery located thereon, 
(H. 5, 12). On the date in question he built a fire about 
a foot in diameter and had a flame shooting up about 2 
feet high. This fire burned for about 8 or 9 minutes and 
was within a foot of a stack of lumber near which the 
barrel of Sealtex, owned by the defendant, Alder-·Child 
Construction Company, was stored. Eddie Hoogland 
allegedly put this fire out, (H. 27, 29), and then made a 
torch (H. 29) out of a stick which \vas about as long as 
his ar1n and around which he wrapped a piece of cloth 
with black stuff on it, which cloth he found on the premi-
ses. It did not at first burn very much until he re-wound 
the cloth. It then really burned and shot up a flame 
of about a foot or a foot and a half. He had this torch 
going for about 5 minutes, (H. 14, 15-23, 24). This torch 
was burning within one and one-half feet of the stack of 
lumber, (H. 23, 24). Eddie then placed the torch on the 
ground and allegedly put the flame out with some sand, 
but the torch continued to smoke, (H. 24, 25). Prior to 
this, Eddie had sat on a piece of machinery located on 
the pre1nises (H. 29), and it 'vas not until after that 
that he directed his attention to the dru1n. When he vvent 
to the drum, he thought that "there might be something 
dangerous in it," but he didn't know, (H. 30). He had not 
observed the drum containing the Sealtex until after he 
was on the premises, (H. 5). He had seen drums like these 
before, " 1The stuff inside they use for road oil," (H. 17, 
18). After observing the barrel and thinking there might 
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be so1nething dangerous in it, he lit a Inatch and held it 
over an opening in the barrel, and then saw some shiny 
black stuff. He then knew it was dangerous and 'vanted 
to put the n1atch out, but before he could do so, the barrel 
exploded, (H. 30). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DE-
FENDANTS' MO'TION FOR SUMl\1ARY JUDGMENT. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANTS ALDER & CHILD WERE NOT LI-
ABLE TO TI-IE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE PLAYGRO·UND 
DOCTRINE. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANTS ALDER & CHILD AS A l\1:ATTER 
OF LA "'VV WERE NOT LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER 
THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE. 
(a) THE INSTRUMENTALITY WHICH INJURES THE 
CHILD MUST ITSELF BE SO ATTRACTIVE 'TO CHILDREN 
OF IMMATURE YEARS THAT ITS EXISTENCE OR MAIN-
·TENANCE ON THE OWNER'S PREMISES MUST CONSTI-
TUTE AN IMPLIED INVITATION TO CHILDREN OR PER-
SONS OF IMMATURE YEARS TO ENTER THE PREr~1ISES 
WHICH THE OWNER IN ·THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE 
CARE COULD FORESEE. 
(b) THE INSTRUMENTALITY ITSELF MUST BE IN-
HERENTLY DANGERO·US AND SUCH DANGEROUS CON-
DITION MUST BE KNOWN 'TO THE OWNER. 
(c) THE INSTRUMENTALITY MUST HAVE BEEN 
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDEN'T AND RE-
SULTING INJURY. 
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(d) THE DOCTRINE IN ANY EVENT CAN ONLY 
APPLY TO CHILDREN OF TENDER AND IMMATURE 
YEARS. 
POINIT IV. 
THE ACCIDENT AS A MATTER OF LAW WAS PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED BY THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
AND CARELESSNESS OF THE PLAINTIFF MINOR. 
POINT V. 
THE PLAINTIFF MINOR WAS A TRESPASSER AS TO 
WHOM THE DEFENDANTS OWED NO DUTY EXCEPT AS 
NOT 'TO WILFULLY CAUSE ANY INJURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DE-
FENDANTS' MOITION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The motion for summary judgment was based 
upon the depositions of the plaintiff minor and his par-
ents, Roelof Hoogland and Louisa Hoogland and the 
depositions of Thomas B. Child and Robert R. Child and 
also upon the affidavit of Robert R. Child, which said 
depositions and affidavit 'vere before the court and are 
a part of this record on appeal. The only counter-affi-
davit filed in the case was that of the plaintiff's attor-
ney, Gordon Hyde (R. 76-79), in which affidavit, among 
other things, the affiant Hyde claims that the Sealtex 
compound involved in the suit emitted explosive fumes 
which should have been known to the defendants, and 
that said compound is known in the industry to be made 
pliable and plastic by reason of volatile substances. No 
affidavit was filed by any member of the so-called in-
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7 
dustry or by anyone claiming to have any kno\vledge 
of the product, that it was either explosive or volatile. 
There was nothing in the affidavit to show that Mr. 
llyde had any p·ersonal knowledge of the matters on 
'vhich he was attempting to testify or that he was com-
petent to testify concerning the same. This affidavit 
wholly failed to co1nply with Rule 56 (e) of the Utah 
Rules of ·Civil Procedure and for that reason is wholly 
ineffectual. Rule 56 (e) reads as follows : 
~'Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as vvould he admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affi'rmatively that the aff~ant is compe-
tent to testify to the rnatter s stated therein. Sworn 
or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached there-
to or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to he supplemented or opposed by de-
positions or by further affidavits." (Italics ours.) 
Hyde's affidavit is nothing more or less than a state-
ment of what he might hope to prove and is not such an 
affidavit as is contemplated or required by the rules. 
Rule 56 (c) provides that the adverse party prior 
to the day of the hearing may serve opposing affidavits, 
and Rule 56 (f) provides that should it appear from 
the affidavit of a party opposing the motion that he 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify his opp.osition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance 
to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had. In this connection, there 
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was no affidavit presented by plaintiff's counsel stating 
that he could not obtain affidavits from persons essential 
to justify his opposition. If a moving party by affidavit 
or otherwise presents materials which would require a 
directed verdict in his favor, if presented at the trial, 
he is then entitled to a summary judgment, ~unless the 
opposing party e~ther shows that affidavits are then 
unavavlable to him, or comes forward w~th some materials 
by affidavit or otherwise that show there i·s a tr~able issue 
of a mater~al fact. 6 }foore Federal Practice, p. 2071, 
Sec. 56.11 ( 3). 
It was clearly established by the depositions and 
affidavit of Robert R. Child that the Sealtex was not 
marked explosive and contained no markings to indicate 
that it was volatile or dangerous. Eiis deposition and 
affidavit further indicated that the pToduct had been 
widely used by them and had never been found to be 
volatile, explosive or dangerous, and they had heard of 
no incidents of any danger involving the use or storage 
of said product. The very purpose of the summary 
judgment procedure is to require the plaintiff to con1e 
forward with affidavits contradicting, if possible, the 
facts set forth in the affidavit of the n1oving party. If 
the connnercial product, Sealtex, was dispensed in con-
tainers rnarked dangerous, volatile or explosive, it 'vas 
incu1nbent upon the plaintiff to produce affidavits to 
this effect frorn parties in a position to lmow, or if said 
product was claimed to be volatile or explosive, it was 
incumbent to obtain such information by affidavit from 
competent persons qualified to do so. In the absence of 
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such opposing affidavits, there was no triable issue and 
the court could hardly have done else than find that the 
Sealtex 'vas not an tmusual or extraordinary thing; that 
it 'vas not volatile, explosive or dangerous, was not so 
1narked, and that the defendants, Alder & Child, had no 
reason to know or suspect that someone might be injured 
through coining in contact with it. The plaintiff minor by 
his own testimony admitted that the Sealtex had not at-
tracted him on the pren1ises, and it was not until after he 
had entered the premises and played thereon, that he 
even observed the drun1. Plaintiff's own testimony indi-
cated that he used the Sealtex in an extraordinary and 
unexpected way and that he knew the Sealtex 1night be 
dangerous before he ever lit the match thereto. The court 
properly granted the motion for summary judgment. 
This will be covered more fully in our argument under 
I>oints II, III, IV and V. 
This court has held that depositions are a proper 
basis on \Yhich to support a motion for summary judg-
ment. See Tempest v. Richardson, 299 Pac. (2d) 124, 
5 Utah (2d) 174. 
Plaintiff complains that summary judgment is a 
drastic remedy and only to be used sparingly; however, 
as indicated by Judge 'Crockett in Richards v. And~erson, 
9 lTtah (2d) 17, 337 Pac. (2d) 59: 
"* * * It is true that summary judgment is a 
severe measure which courts should be reluctant 
to use, and that doubts should be resolved in favor 
of allowing a full trial of the case. Yet it does 
have the salutary purpose of not requi·ring the 
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time, trouble and expense of trial, when the best 
showing the plaintiff could make would not entitle 
him to recover under the law." (Italics ours) 
The best showing made by the plaintiff at the pre-
trial hearing failed to disclose any competent evidence 
indicating negligence on the part of Alder-Child or any-
thing upon which liability as against them could be 
founded. The court properly granted the summary judg-
ment. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANTS ALD.ER & CHILD WERE NOT LI-
ABLE ·TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER THE PLAYGROUND 
DOCTRINE. 
In his argument under this phase of the case plain-
tiff's counsel concedes that before the doctrine could in 
any event apply, at least two things must be present: 
(1) The premises must either have been a playground 
or known to be a place where children habitually played; 
and (2) The defendants must have maintained a danger-
ous condition on said premises of which no '\Varning was 
g:tven. 
The evidence on which the sum1nary judgment '\vas 
based clearly indicated that Thomas B. Child's home was 
located at 452 South 8th East; that he was a mason con-
tractor and that to the rear of his home he had a lot on 
which he stored scaffolding and other materials. He also 
had a shed which housed some of his tools. It was all 
fenced and could not be reached except through two gates 
which were generally not locked, or unless a person 
climbed over the fence. The fence varied in height from 
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4 t~> 6 feet. There were no openings in it, (C. 20, 21). He 
did not let children play in his yard, but on occasion had 
chased them out whenever he saw them there. This was 
not a lot of times, ('C. 22, 23). l-Ie had erected some 
statues on his lot, to the south of the storage area, (C. 24) 
which rnight be interesting to adults, but not to children. 
He had never permitted children to come upon said 
pre1nises to see such statues unless accompanied by 
gro\\rnups, (C. 26). If he ever noticed any openings or 
da1nage to the fencing, he repaired it, (C. 33). On the 
north end the fence did go against some sheds, and on 
occasion the children had made an opening between the 
shed and the fence and he had repaired such opening 
'vhenever he observed it, (C. 34). 1-Ie had never had 
any accident occur before in his yard, (C. 36·). 
The only evidence in this case indicates that Thomas 
B. Child did not per1nit his yard to be used as a play-
ground and that as a matter of fact it was not so used; 
that he took all reasonable precautions to keep children 
out of his yard. The owner does not have a duty at his 
peril of keeping children off his property. We submit 
that in this case Thomas B. Child did all that was required 
of him in keeping the property fenced and ordering chil-
dren therefrom when he saw them on the property. It 
"\Yas not his duty to make a trespass by children impos-
sible. See T,aylor v. Minneapolis & St. Lo~tis R.R. Co., 
(Io,va) 163 N.W. 405, O'Conner v. Ill. C.R. Co., (La.) 10 
So. 678, Grube v. Balt~more (Md.) 103 A. 948. 
If there should be any conceivable issue of a play-
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ground by Thomas B. Child, there is certainly no issue 
of the same as to Child and Alder. They never knew of 
any holes in the fences surrounding the premises, had 
never seen kids running through the yard or playing in 
it, and there is nothing to indicate that Alder or Child 
had any kno,vledge of any use of said premises by chil-
dren, and they could not, therefore, be held liable under 
the theory that the pren1ises 'vere used as a playground. 
Certainly, they did not own the premises and were not 
using them as a playground in any event. 
In the second place, the defendants did not store 
a dangerous or explosive product upon the premises. 
The Utah Supreme ·Court in the case of Bogdon v. Los 
Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Co., 59 lTtah 505, 205 
Pac. 571, had occasion to consider the question of explo-
sive or dangerous substances, and in the course of the 
opinion stated: 
"* * * It is only where a highly explosive sub-
stance or other dangerous instrumentality is know-
ingly placed in a public place where people, includ-
ing children, have a right to be, or "There such a 
substance or instrumentality or agency is lrnowing-
ly placed or left 'in the 'Yay that he (the owner) 
knows the licensee - a child of tender years -
is habitually .accustomed to go, and where an 
ordinarily prudent person would reasonably ex-
pect him to go, and be thereby injured,' that cre-
ates liability. * * *." (Italics contained in opinion) 
A review of a nun1ber of explosive cases is set forth 
In that opinion, following which the Supreme Court 
stated: 
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"There i~ not a single case that has been cited 
\vhere the explosive was not kno,vingly stored or 
left at a place which was either a public place, or 
where it was knovvn that children had a right to 
go, and where they ordinarily did go, or the place 
vvhere the explosive \vas stored or placed was one 
to which children had access and to which any 
person of ordinary prudence and intelligence 
would reasonably expect that children would go 
and rnight suffer injury. In this cas~e, however, 
the undisp~tted evidence is to the effect that the 
defendant did not know that there was any powd.er 
in the car. Nat being cognizant of that fact, it 
could not guard against the acci'dent. * * *" 
(Italics ours) 
Since in that case the defendant did not kno\V that 
the po,vder "\-Vas left in the car by the consignee, the court 
held that under the undisputed facts the case was not 
brought \vithin the doctrine of storing dangerous explo-
sives on the o\vner's pren1ises or at places where persons 
including children are known to go or near \vhich they 
habitually pass. Again, the court said: 
'~ * * * We are here dealing with a case where 
the defendant is sought to be held liable upon the 
ground that it was guilty of negligence in not 
anticipating a danger when the evidence shows 
that it had neither the knowledge, nor sufficient 
time to acquire kno\vledge, that there was any 
danger. 
"While the accident was an unfortunate one, 
yet it was one which the defendant could not have 
foreseen, and therefore cannot legally be held li-
able for. In the conduct of modern business enter-
prises, accidents will, and of necessity must, hap-
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pen. The law, however, does not impose liability 
unless the party charged with negligence could by 
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence have 
prevented the accident. Although children of ten-
der years are favored by the law, yet, even before 
one of them can recover for an injury, it must 
appear that the person causing the injury o\ved 
a duty to the injured child, and that he negligently 
failed to discharge that duty by failing to exercise 
that degree of care that the law imposed under the 
circurnstances. It goes without saying that one 
cannot discharge a duty before it is known to exist, 
and while actual knowledge of its existence is not 
always necessary, yet the facts must be such that 
knowledge may be imputed upon the ground that 
the person charged by the exercise of reasonable 
care ought to have kno\\m, and hence, in contem-
plation of lavv, did know. The undisputed facts in 
this case are not such as will impute knowledge 
to the defendant." 
In the instant case the evidence is uncontradicted that 
none of the defendants kne\v that there \Yas any explosive 
or dangerous -condition in connection \Yith the storing of 
the Sealtex .. The experience of the defendants Alder and 
Child was exactly to the contrary. There was nothing 
on which to place them upon notice of any explosive or 
dangerous qualities, and indeed, as hereafter indicated 
under point III (b), the Sealtex \Yas not inherently dan-
gerous in and of itself. The evidence is also positive that 
the Sealtex was not stored in a public place and at least 
so far as the defendants Alder and Child are concerned, 
it was not stored in a place 'vhere children had a right 
to go or where they or either of them lmew that they 
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ordinarily did go or to 'vhich children had access. Ac-
cordingly, under the decision of the Bogdon case there 
could be no liability as to the defendants Alder and Child 
under this particular phase of the matter. 
See also St. Lo1tis l.M. & S.R. Co. v. Wagoner, (Ark.) 
166 S.W. 948.- In that case an empty alcohol barrel had 
been shipped over the defendant's railroad and unloaded 
at its destination wheTe it was placed on the station 
platform by the defendant's employee. The weigh bill 
did not show that the barrel had inflammables in it and 
there was nothing to call the receiving agent's attention 
to the barrel as having explosives in it or as being dan-
gerous. 'Two boys accompanied their parents to the 
railroad station, and while the father was in the waiting 
room, the boys played on the platform around the empty 
barrel. A one-half inch cork stopped in a hole at the end 
of the barrel protruded about one-half inch out of the 
hole and when pulled out, made a hissing sound. The boys 
"\vould blow their breath in the barrel, and it would blow 
back on them. One of the boys struck a match and started 
to stick it in the barrel when an explosion occurred, caus-
ing injury to both boys. The father brought suit in his 
O"\Vn behalf and as next friend, alleging negligence on the 
part of the defendant in leaving the barrel on a platform 
"\vhere children were accustomed to play. Defendant's re-
quest for instructions that the plaintiffs were bare li-
censees and for a directed verdict were refused, as was 
also a request for instruction that the lighting of the 
match "\vas the proximate cause of the injuries and for 
a directed verdict. In that case on appeal the appellate 
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court held that the doctrine of attractive nuisance did not 
apply and there was no evidence to support the verdict. 
In Galloway v. Texas Canst. Co. (La.) 150 So. 103, 
plaintiff sought to recover for injuries to t\vo 12-year-old 
boys \\7ho were injured "\vhen a companion thre·w .. a fire-
cracker into a bung hole of an e1npty paint drun1 \Yhich 
the defendant had deposited in the plaintiff's backyard 
at the request of a boarder. The drum had been practi-
cally emptied of paint, but contained gases ''Thich ex-
ploded when the firecracker \vas placed in the hole. In 
affir1ning a judgment of dis1nissal, the court said: 
"* * * There is no evidence to sho\v that a 
paint drum "\vith a small amount of paint in the 
bottom is inherently or intrinsically dangerous. 
It is not to be sup·posed that a person could reason-
ably anticipate that fire-crackers \vould be thro\vn 
into the drum through the bung-hole." 
In appellant's brief it is sought to charge Robert R. 
Child on the theory that he was a civil engineer and 
therefore should have known the che1nical c.ontent of the 
Sealtex. The fact of the matter is that Robert R. Child 
took, but did not complete, a civil engineering course at 
the University of Utah, took a general one year course 
in Chemistry, but had no idea \vhat Sealtex \vas made of. 
He knew it emitted no fumes, (C. 10, 11, 4). He knew 
his men smoked \vhile applying it. He knew it was un-
necessary to ventilate when applying it indoors, (C. 5). 
It did not smell like road asphalt, but like e1nulsion as-
phalt, and he had no idea what the chemical content of 
it was, (·C. 5, 6, 15). 
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There can be no recovery under the playground doe-
trine in the third place because that doctrine 'vould only 
apply to children of tender years. The plaintiff minor 
'vas 1-l: years of age at the time of the accident and was 
not a person of tender years to whom the doctrine could 
apply. See cases cited under Point III (d). 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANTS ALDER & CHILD AS A MATTER 
OF LAW WERE NOT LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF UNDER 
·THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE. 
This court in numerous cases has considered the doe-
trine of attractive nuisance. Judge McDonough in the 
case of Davis v. Provo CiJty Corporation, 1 Utah (2d) 
2-±4, 265 Pac. ( 2d) 415, states that the "doctrine merely 
sets a standard of care toward trespassers incumbent 
upon a possessor of property in the use of such property. 
lie has a duty to take safety precautions, where, by 
reason of its attractiveness, he has notice that children 
"~in come upon his property in proximity to a dangerous 
condition or instrumentality." 
As stated in Peterson v. Farmers' Grain & llfillivng 
Co., 69 Utah 395, 255 Pac. 436: 
"This doctrine is to the general effect that 
under certain circumstances it is actionable negli-
gence to leave on one's premises an unguarded 
dangerous thtng, to which children are likely to 
be attracted for sport or play. This rule of li,abili-
ty is subject to ntttmerous limitations, and 'needs 
very careful statement not to make it an unjust 
and impract~cable requirem.ent,' and 'the principle, 
if accepted, must be oau,tiously applie~d.' United 
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Zinc & ·Chemical ·Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 S. 
Ct. 299, 66 L. Ed. 615, 36 A.L.R. 28. The subject 
has been before this court in at least five cases. 
* * * In one of these cases only was liability up-
held. In the other four it was denied." (Italics 
OUTS.) 
As stated by Judge Straup in Smalley v. Rio Grande 
vV estern Rai.Zroad, 34 U t~h 423, 98 Pac. 311 : 
"The doctrine underlying the 'turntable' cases 
is that the leaving or maintaining of a dangerous 
and attractive machine, or other instrument or 
agency, upon one's premises_, under circumstances 
"\vhich naturally tend to attract or allure young 
children of immature judgment, and to induce 
them to believe that they are at liberty to enter 
and handle or play with it, is tantamount to an 
implied invitation to enter." (Italics ours.) 
In Charvoz v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 455, 131 Pac. 
901, the court quotes with approval from Payne v. Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598,221 Pac. 568: 
"As pointed out by this court both in the 
Brown case and again in the case of Smalley v. 
Railroad, 34 Utah 447, 448, 98 Pac. 311, a thing 
may be attractive or alluring to children and be 
inherently dangerous and yet not fall within the 
principle governing the turntable cases. Again, 
a thing may be attractive, but whether it is also 
dangerous may be a question of fact; or it may 
be both attractive and dangerous and yet not be 
the proximate cause of the injury complained of; 
or, although attractive and dangerous, it may-
nevertheless be common and natural and of a 
character that makes it impracticable to be guard-
ed against. In all such cases the thing, whatever 
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it may be, lacks the element which controls the 
doctrine of the turntable cases, namely, that to 
ntaintain it in an unprotected or unguarded condi-
tion constitutes it an attractive and dangerous 
nuisance. * * *" 
See also Christi,ansen v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake 
Railroad Co., 77 Utah 85, 291 Pac. 926, wherein a quo-
tation fro1n Bogdon v. Los Angeles & Sa.lt Lake Railroad 
Co., 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac. 571, is cited with approval: 
"Although children of t~ender years are 
favored by the law, yet, even before one of them 
can recover for an injury, it must: appea,r thal the 
person causing the injury owed a duty to the in-
jured child, and that he negligently failed to dis-
charge that duty by failing to exercise that degree 
of care that the law imposed under the circum-
stances. It goes wi:thout saying that one cannot 
discharge a duty before it is known to exiJst, and 
"\\Thile actual knowledge of its existence is not al-
vvays necessary, yet the facts must be such that 
knowledge may be imputed upon the ground that 
the person charged by the exercise of reasonable 
care ought to have known, and hence, in contem-
plation of law, did know. The undisputed facts in 
this case are not such as will impute knowledge to 
the defendant." (Italics ours.) 
The above and foregoing authorities indicate that 
before the doctrine applies, the following must be estab-
lished: (1) The instrumentality which injures the child 
must itself be so attractive to children of immature years 
that its existence or maintenance on the owner's premises 
must constitute an implied invitation to children or per-
sons of immature years to enter the premises which the 
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owner in the exercise of reasonable care could foresee; 
(2) The instrumentality itself must be inherently danger-
ous and such dangerous condition must be known to the 
owner; ( 3) ~The instrumentality must have been the proxi-
mate cause of the accident and resulting injury; (4) The 
doctrine in any event can only apply to children of tender 
and immature years. 
(a) THE IN"STRUMENTALITY WHICH INJURES THE 
CHILD MUST ITSELF BE SO ATTRACTIVE 'TO CHILDREN 
OF IMMATURE YEARS THAT ITS EXISTEN·CE OR MAIN-
·TENAN'CE ON THE OWNER'S PREMISES MUST CONSTI-
TUTE AN IMPLIED INVITATION TO CHILDREN OR PER-
SONS OF IMMATURE YEARS TO ENTER THE PREMISES 
WHICH THE OWNER IN 'THE EXERCISE OF REASONABLE 
CARE COULD FORESEE. 
The drums in question were not unusual or out of the 
ordinary. They were composed of black metal with no 
markings on the outside thereof to indicate that the con-
tents were flammable, explosive or dangerous. They 
could have contained water or any number of substances. 
They were common place and of the type frequently seen 
around service stations and used as trash containers. 
There was nothing about the drums then1selves which 
would lead an ordinary reasonable and prudent person 
to suspect that they would he attractive to children. Fur-
thermore, the plaintiff minor was not attracted to the 
barrels beeause he did not even know that the barrels 
were on the pre1nises until after he had entered the same. 
lie had not been attracted to the premises by the barrels 
in any event, but by the rocks and 1nachines which he had 
seen on the pren1ises and on which he had played. It was 
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not until after he had entered the premises, played on 
the Inachines and built a fire on the day of the accident 
that he paid any attention at all to the barrel or its con-
tents. 
See Bogdon v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad 
Co., 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac. 571. In that case a 1ninor went 
upon a railroad right of way looking for sheep, and \Yhile 
there, collected from the floor of a railroad car soxne 
powder \Vhich he exploded, causing severe burns to hiin-
self. The Supreme Court held that the powder did not 
entice the minor upon the railroad premises so as to ren-
der the railroad company liable under the attractive nui-
sance doctrine. The car had been unloaded by the povv-
der co1npany, to \vhom it was consigned, and there was no 
evidence that the railroad or its agents had any kno\vl-
edge that there was any powder left in the car. The plain-
tiff had no knowledge until he got to the premises and 
entered the car, and the Sup·reme Court held that: 
"The plaintiff, therefore, could not have been 
lured or attracted to the depot grounds of the 
defendant or to the car in question through any 
knowledge that there was powder in the car." 
See also Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598, 
221 Pac. 568. That case involved a sugar dump which had 
been constructed on the defendant's premises and which 
to defendant's knowledge had on occasions been used as 
a sleigh-riding hill. At the time of the accident the minor 
swung on an overhead cable, causing it to come off its 
pulley and in attempting to put it back on its pulley, 
caused it to swing over and come in contact with an elec-
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tric wire over which the defendant had no supervision, 
and which caused the damages for which the recovery 
was sought. In denying the application of the doctrine, 
the Supreme Court said: 
"* * * As to him the loose hanging cables did 
not constitute an attraction, for with apparent 
deliberation he chose not to use the cables for the 
purpose of sliding down them, as his associate 
did a few moments before the accident. Not until 
his companion had discovered that the cable had 
come off the pulley and not until his companion 
had failed in his efforts to replace it did the plain-
tiff concern himself with the cable at all. And 
then, when he did concern himself with it, he did 
with the cable that which the defendant certainly 
could never have anticipated that he or any other 
boy or girl would do with it. He swung it out-
ward in an attempt to flip it back upon its pulley, 
and swung it so far that it came in contact with 
the electric wire of the power line, over which the 
defendant had no sup·ervision or control, and 
which, was outside of the right of way upon which 
defendant's structure was built. It certainly can-
not be said that hvs conduct was that of a child 
of immature years attract.ed to a dangerous in-
strumentality maintained by the defend.ant, so as 
to bring him wi~thin the doctrtne of the decis~ons of 
thvs court herein before referred to. Nor can vt be 
said that the circumstances of the accident were 
such that the defendant might reasonably have 
.antiJcipat~ed them, and so have been required to 
guard against them. The comment of this court 
in the case of Bogdon v. Railroad, supra, is equally 
applicable here : 
'There is * * * nothing in this case which 
would authorize a finding that the plaintiff 
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was enticed, lured, or attracted by anything 
the defendant did or omitted to do to the car 
(structure) in question, and hence the case 
clearly and manifestly does not come within 
the doctrine of the turntable cases or that of 
attractive nuisances.' 
"The plaintiff was not attracted to the struc-
ture by reason of the loose hanging cables, and 
'vhen he reached the structure he was not attracted 
to them by any appeal that they made to his child-
ish instincts. There is no evidence that any other 
child at any time was attracted by and amused 
itself with the -cables, except that it does appear 
that plaintiff's companion safely slid down one 
of the cables immediately before the accident, and 
there is not the slightest suggestion in the· evidence 
that sliding down the cables was at all dangerous. 
At any rate, the plaintiff w·as not attract:ed by the 
cable as a thing to sliJde .down upon, nor was he 
t"njwred in so doing. He was not injure1d untvl 
he made use of the cable in a most unusual and 
·extraordinary way, and used it in such a uJay 
that i~t cannot possibly be said that the defendant 
might have reasonably anticipate~d such use." 
(Italics ours.) 
As indicated in the Payne case, it cannot be said that 
the plaintiff minor was attracted to the drum, nor was he 
injured until he made use of the drum in a most unusual 
and extraordinary way, to-wit: Attempting to set a fire 
about it or in it and in such a way that it could not pos-
sibly be said that the defendants Alde-r and Child might 
reasonably have anticipated such use. 
See also Hayko v. Colorado and Utah Coal Company, 
(Colo.) 235 Pac. 373. In that case the plaintiff, a 10 year 
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old boy, with a playmate entered a shack- on the defend-
ant's p,remises and took from the shack a box of dynamite 
caps and while trying to prick out the contents of one of 
them with a pin, the cap exploded, injuring him. The 
back of the shack but not the open door could be seen 
from nearby where people usually passed. In denying 
the application, the Colorado Supreme Court said: 
"The defendant makes several ansV\'ers. One 
of them, which we think is sufficient, may be stated 
thus: The plaintiff was a trespasser to whom 
there was owing no duty, unless under the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine ; that the negligence under 
said doctrine consists in n1aintaining an attraction 
which entices to trespass, not merely entices one 
after he has become a trespasser; that plaintiff 
could not see the box of caps till he had trespassed; 
that therefore the caps cannot be classed as the 
attraction; that the attractive agency must be an 
unusual thing, of unusual attraction, not an ordin-
ary thing; and that the shack was usual and ordin-
ary, and so, as a matter of la,v, cannot be con-
sidered as an attraction to trespass." 
So, also, under the present case the drm11 upon the de-
fendant's pren1ises was not an unusual and extraordinary 
thing, and, as we have heretofore indicated, it ·wras only 
after the plaintiff entered the pre1nises for other things 
which he observed that he became attracted to the barrel 
and put it to an unusual and extraordinary use 'vhich 
could not have been anticipated by the defendants. 
(b) THE INSTRUMENTALITY ITSELF MUST BE IN-
HERENTLY DANGERO,US AND SUCH DANGEROUS CON-
DITION MUST BE KNOWN TO THE OWNER. 
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The Sealtex stored on the pre1nises was not danger-
ous, or, if so, was not kno,Yn or in the. exercise of due 
care could not have been knovvn to be dangerous by the 
defendants Alder and Child. The Sealtex was a commer-
cial product sold in the 53 gallon drum vvith no indication 
thereon that the product was flammable, dangerous or 
explosive. It had been extensively used by Alder-Child 
Co1npany in their construction activities and had never 
been known b~T the1n to be dangerous, explosive or flarn-
lnable, and they had never heard of any fire, danger or 
explosion involving the use of said product. 
See Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598, 221 
Pac. 568, where the court said: 
"Under the evidence, we believe that the struc-
ture involved here was not shown to be either 
novel in character or attractive or dangerous to 
children, within the meaning of the Utah cases. 
It was no more novel in character than a cattle 
loading chute or a water tank upon a railroad 
right of vvay, and is not shown to have been any 
more attractive or dangerous than such structures 
1night be. Even though we assume that it was at-
tractive as a coasting place, or a place over which 
to race horses, that it had been so used by children, 
and that the defendant was charged with notice 
that it was attractive to boys and girls for such 
purposes, still there is not the slightest suggestion 
in the evidence that the structure was at all dan-
gerous when so used. The injury susta~ned by the 
plaintiff was from a use whvch no reasonable man 
could or would have anticipated, and from a use 
to which no child vs shown to have theretofore 
put it." (Italics ours.) 
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In the case of Bogdon v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake 
R~ailroad Co., 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac. 571, supra, p. 12, the 
Utah Supreme Court indicates that the dangerous sub-
stance must be known to the defendant. 
In the instant case the Sealtex was not marked as 
flammable, dangerous or explosive, was not known by 
experience to be of that character, and the defendants 
Alder and Child in their operations had never known it 
or found it to be of such a character. The defendants 
Alder and Child could not reasonably have anticipated 
the use which the plaintiff minor attempted to make of 
the barrel, to-wit: putting a lighted match or setting fire 
to the contents of the barrel, which was the thing that 
caused the explosion or fire. The barrel itself and its con-
tents were not inherently dangerous to children within the 
meaning of the Utah cases. 
See also Burley v. ]j([ cDowell, (Colo.) 298 Pac. (2d) 
399. In that case damages were sought on behalf of a 9 
year old boy, who, while playing with the defendant's 
child on the defendant's premises, \Yas burned when gaso-
line, which the boys had unauthorizedly pTocured from a 
building on the premises, was ignited by candle on a toy 
boat. Judgment was rendered for the defendants, from 
which the plaintiff took an appeal. The Supreme Court 
held that the defendants in keeping gasoline for lawful 
and reasonable purposes in place \vhere the boy had been 
directed not to go were not guilty of negligence and could 
not be held to duty to have anticipated the boy's action. 
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Among other things, the court said the fact that the 
defendants-
"kept a small quantity of gasoline mixed with oil 
in a place other than the residence, and did not 
reasonably anticipate that a nine year old boy, 
knowing the explosive quality of the mixture, 
would go where he had been forbidden and obtain 
some of this mixture to be used in connection with 
a lighted candle, *** We agree with the conclu-
sions of the trial court that this was an unfortun-
ate accident, and in fairness and justice to defend-
ants, there is no act to vvhich the court can attach 
negligence in failing to do what ordinary, prudent 
persons would do in the maintenance of their 
premises, \Vhere the minor, as an invitee, became 
a trespasser. Defendants cannot be held to antici-
pate such actions as were here indulged by the 
minor." 
See also LeDuc v. Detroit Edi,son (Mich.) 235 N.W. 
83~, in which the court held that the attractive nuisance 
doctrine was not applicable to permit a recovery for the 
death of a six year old boy. In that case a vacant lot had 
been used by children as a playground for many years, 
during which time they had cut and burned weeds. The 
defendant had been working nearby doing some street 
repairs, and on the week-end left a work cart containing 
a gasoline tank on a parkway on the same side of the 
street as the lot, the faucet being locked with a key similar 
to that of a house water tap key. Over the week-end 15 
or 20 boys, ranging in ages from 14 years down, started 
pulling and burning weeds in the lot. One of them got a 
water tap key, unlocked the faucet on the cart and got 
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some gasoline from it to aid the burning. As a 10 year 
old boy came toward the fire with a can of gasoline, a 
14 year old boy attempted to take it from him. In the 
struggle gasoline was spilled on the decedent, who had 
come up with a burning match, but who had taken no part 
in the struggle. He received burns which caused his death. 
The court held that the cart did not constitute an attrac-
tive nuisance; that the children were not attracted to the 
cart in play, nor did the train of events which led to the 
injury start from a spontaneous and irresponsible taking 
of an enticing object. 
See also Dahl v. Valley Dredging Co. (~linn.) 145 
N.W. 796. In that case a 7 year old boy while playing 
with his brothers, ages 9 and 13, about the defendant's 
dredging machine, was burned when one of the older boys 
applied a match to some 'vaste and poured on some nap-
tha kept in a coffee pot and used by the defendant in 
starting the machine. The 1finnesota court refused to 
apply the attractive nuisance doctrine, p·ointing out that 
it is a matter of conunon knowledge that both kerosine and 
gasoline are usually kept in the majority of households 
and are seldom guarded so that children cannot get pos-
session of them; that these liquids are not naturally at-
tractive to children and are dangerous only "~hen brought 
into contact with fire. 
See also Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corporation, 19 N.E. 
(2d) 981, in "rhich the New York Court of Appeals stated 
the question as follows: 
''The question presented is 'vhether want of 
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care may be attributed to a business man in the 
daily eonduct of his business under the following 
circumstances: Upon the premises of defendant 
a drip can is left under the faucet of a gasoline 
drum from which gasoline is taken daily for the 
refueling of gasoline engines. Two boys trespass 
upon these premises after the close of business 
and in the night time, steal the drip· can half full of 
gasoline, take it away from the property of defend-
ant out into the street, and there attempt to thro\v 
it upon a fire theretofore started by these boys 
and others, causing the ignition of the gasoline. 
The infant plaintiff, a boy of ten, while walking 
along the street, stopped to look at the fire and, 
in attempting to run past the fire, tripped and fell 
into the fire, thereby sustaining the injuries for 
which suit is brought." 
The case vvas submitted to a jur~r and a verdict for the 
plaintiff returned on both theories of negligence and 
nuisance. The judgment was reversed on both grounds. 
The ground of negligence was on the theory that the de-
fendant kne\v that children were accustomed to play in 
and about the premises, and that under these circum-
stances it was negligent for the defendant to leave a 
can exposed underneath the spicket to collect the gaso-
line drippings. The court, a1nong other things, stated: 
"While highly inflammable, the use of gaso-
line does not place the case at bar within the ex-
ception concerning the use of inherently dangerous 
materials." 
See also to the same effect Beickert v. G. M. Labora-
tories (N.Y.) 151 N.E. 195. In that case an infant plain-
tiff was burned by the igniting of some pieces of film 
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which another boy had picked up in the rear of the defend-
ant's plant. An employee had attempted to burn some 
old film, but in the process some of the pieces had escaped 
into the air and come down onto the lot. A child picked 
up some of the loose pieces and while lighting a match 
to it, an explosion occurred and he was burned. At the 
close of the plaintiff's 'case the judgment was entered 
for the defendant which on appeal was affirmed. The 
New York court said that the films themselves were not 
inherently dangerous unless brought in contact with fire. 
See also Hall v. N~tv York Telephone Company, 
(N.Y.) 108 N.E. 182, in which it was held that a bottle 
of denatured alcohol was not an inherently dangerous 
substance. 
See also Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 
Pac. 570, in which it was said that common objects should 
be held as a matter of law not to be within the rule, al-
though they may have some attraction for children and 
expose them to some danger. 
See Martin v. Northern P. R. (Mont.) 149 Pac. 89, 
wherein it was held that the owner must know that the 
device or object is usually dangerous and alluring to chil-
dren of tender years and that such children were or were 
likely to be attracted to it. 
(c) THE INSTRUMENTALITY MUST HAVE BEEN 
THE PROXIMA'TE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND RE-
SULTING INJURY. 
In Charvoz v. Salt Lake CiJty, 42 Utah 455, 131 Pac. 
901, supra, page 18, the Utah Supre1ne Court held that 
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the attractiveness must be shown to have been the proxi-
Inate cause of the child's injury. This was also the ruling 
of the 1Ttah Supreme Court in the case of Bogdon v. Los 
Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Co., 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac. 
371, supra, page 12. As we have heretofore seen, the 
thing which attracted the plaintiff on the premises in the 
first place was not the barrel, and, therefore, the attrac-
tiveness was not and could not be considered the proxi-
Inate 'cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See also cases cited 
under voint II. 
See also Anderson v. Karstens, 218 Ill. Appeal 285. 
In that case the defendant, a cement contractor, used a 
garage and vacant lot in his business in which he stored 
certain property including 3 cans near a tool shed \vhich 
he had left there for the garbage men to pick up. The 
sediment in the discarded cans was lubricating oil that 
\ras non-explosive and would not burn below 365 degrees 
fahrenheit. On the oecasion in question two boys, ages 5 
and 8, \Vent on the lot, found the cans, and proceeded to 
amuse themselves by dropping matches in the cans. They 
at first only smoldered, but then one of the children 
poured the contents of another can into a 5 gallon oil can 
and then dropped matches, following which an explosion 
occurred. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. On 
appeal it was held that the proximate cause of the aeci-
dent was the intervening act of the other children. 
One of the tests of proximate cause is whether the 
act could reasonably have been foreseen by the defend-
ants. \\T e do not believe that the defendants could reason-
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ably foresee that a 14-year old boy in the seventh grade 
of school would enter the premises and attempt to set a 
fire in or about the Sealtex drum. The leaving of the 
drum of Sealtex on the premises was not the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 
(d) THE DOCTRINE IN ANY EVENT CAN ONLY 
APPLY T;O CHILDREN OF TENDER AND IMMATURE 
YEARS. 
The plaintiff rninor 'vas not a child of tender years 
to whom the doctrine could in any event apply. See Bog-
don v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Ra£lroa.d Co., 59 lTtah 505, 
205 Pac. 571, wherein it is said: 
"The doctrine underlying the 'turntable' cases 
is that the leaving or maintaining of a dangerous 
and attractive machine, or other instrument or 
agency, upon one's pTemises, under circu1nstances 
"\\Thich naturally tend to attract or allure you,ng 
chvldren of i'mmature ju.dgntent, and to induce 
them to believe that they are at liberty to enter 
and handle or play "~ith it is tanta1nount to an 
implied invitation to enter.~' (Italics ours.) 
See Moseley v. Kansas City (I(an.) 228 Pac. (2d) 
699. In that case action \vas brought for the \Yrongful 
death of a minor when he climbed an electric light pole 
and obtained a charge of electricity producing his death. 
The minor was 16 years of age, but it \Yas alleged was of 
''low intelligence quotient, of back\\rard and arrested 
mentality, which \Vas that of an ordinary child of 12 or 
13 years. He had just finished the 8th grade of the public 
schools and in both the 7th and 8th grade had been suit-
able only for and carried in the lo\v grade classes." Dem-
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urrers \vere filed by the defendants ang _were overruled, 
from which an appeal was taken. The Kansas Supreme 
Court in reversing the statement and sustaining the de-
murrer said : 
'
4 The attractive nuisance doctrine, recognized 
by the federal courts and by the courts of son1e 
(not all) of the states, including l(ansas, is a modi-
fication of the general rules of liability for negli-
gence and applies only to a child of • tender years/ 
in which the child is a trespasser, at least in a 
technical sense, but is excused from the normal 
liability of a trespasser because of an attractive 
obje·ct or situation, dangerous if used or handled 
by children who by reason of their tender years 
lack capacity to know or realize the danger of 
being about or handling the attractive object or 
condition. It does not apply to adults. ~r either 
does ~t apply to children old enough to know the 
possible danger involved. The term 'tender years' 
never has been defined in exact years and months, 
but ~"n the overwhelming majority of juris.dvct~ons, 
where the doctrine is used, it i·s rarely applied in 
the case of a child more than ten years of age. In 
a relatively few instances, each dealing \vith an un-
usual situation, the doctrine has been applied to a 
child of the age of eleven, twelve, thirteen or four-
teen years of age. The courts 1tniversally hold 
that the doctrine is not applicable to ,a normal child 
more than fourteen ye.ars of age. The fact that a 
ch~ld, older than the normal age to which the doc-
trine is applied, has been backward in his work at 
school is not deemed sufficient to include the child 
within the .doctrine, unless there vs a show~ng that 
the backwardness im his studies iJs the result of 
mental impairment or deficiency." (Italics ours) 
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See also P.ayne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598, 
221 Pac. 568. In that case the minor involved at the time 
of the accident was 14 years and 8 months of age. The 
Supreme Court of Utah said: 
"It may indeed be seriously questioned 
whether a lad of plaintiff's age and mentality may 
avail himself of the doctrine here involved; but 
we think that certainly he cannot under the pecu-
liar facts in this case. ***" 
In the present case Eddie Hoogland \Yas 14 years 
of age at the time of the aecident. He was a student in the 
7th grade at the Webster Schol and would have started 
Junior High School the next year. 
At page 19 of appellant's brief mention is made of 
an affidavit setting forth that the plaintiff's mental age 
was less than 8 years. vV e find no such document or affi-
davit on file, and in any event, such affidavit would have 
to be by a person competent to give such testimony. This 
same contention was raised in the Kansas case of Moseley 
v. Kansas O~ty, supTa, and in that case the Kansas court 
had held that even though a 14 year old hoy \vas back-
ward in his work at school, this ".,.as not sufficient to in-
clude the child \vithin the doctrine, unless there \Yas a 
showing that the backwardness in his studies "~as the 
result of mental iinpairinent or deficiency. There is no-
thing in the record at all to indicate that this child \ras 
mentally backward or deficient. It \vas incumbent upon 
the plaintiff to avoid a sumn1ary judgment on this ground 
to produce by eo1npetent affidavit by someone qualified 
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to testify that Eddie Hoogland was mentally deficient 
or back\va.rd. 
The answers in his deposition show hi1n to have been 
a nor1nal and a bright boy. Furthermore, in his deposi-
tion hP testified that he thought "there might be some-
thing dangerous" in the barrel. Notwithstanding such 
kno\vledge, he allegedly lit a match and held it about 5 
inches over an opening in the barrel, at which time he saw 
so1ne black, shiny stuff. He then stated he knew that it 
\Vas dangerous and wanted to put the match out, thereby 
indicating that he knew that a match, if applied to a 
dangerous substance, could produce disastrous conse-
quences. All of this knowledge he had prior to the time 
that he lit the match. Notwithstanding the fact that he 
thought the contents of the barrel might be dangerous, 
and knowing that a match applied to a dangerous sub-
stance could prove hazardous, he nonetheless applied a 
1natch to the contents. This is certainly not the case of a 
child of tender years doing something without kno\vledge 
or appreciation of the hazard involved. Before he ever 
lit the 1natch, this 14 year old boy thought it might be 
dangerous, but, nonetheless, did so. Eddie was old enough 
to realize that he had done something wrong when he 
entered the ·Child premises without permission, because 
when he sa\v a man coming out, ''he just hid behind soine-
thing." (H. 20). Under these circumstances the attractive 
nuisance doctrine cannot and should not apply. 
See also B~anan v. Wimsatt (District of ~Columbia) 
298 Fed. 833, in which the Federal District Court of Ap-
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peals stated that the attractive nuisance doctrine "ex-
cludes minors who have reached the age of discretion, 
or, who, knowing the hazard, assume the risk of doing 
that which will imperil their lives or limbs. In so holding 
we do no more than has been done by the majority of the 
states which have dealt "rith such matters, and by the 
Supreme Court itself.'' 
In Belt R. Co. v. Charters, 123 Ill. Appeal322, it was 
stated that in practically every instance where the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine was applied it involved children 
less than 10 years of age and incapable of exercising 
ordinary care. 
See also lianna v. Iowa C. R. Co., 129 Ill. Appeal134, 
in which it was held that the presumption that a 12 year 
old boy had the capacity to comprehend the dangers he 
incurs in going upon a floating log on a pond which he 
had visited on previous occasions was held not overcome 
by a showing that he was of humble parentage, that he 
was reared in a home possessing few books, of little cul-
ture, and that he 'vas behind the average child of his age 
in studies. 
The cases of Keck v. Woodring, 208 Pac. (2d) 1133, 
and Mosely v. J(ansas City, 228 Pac. (2d) 843, supra, page 
32, cited by counsel in support of his position both in-
volve situations where the attractive nuisance doctrine 
as a matter of law was held not applicable because the 
minor was not of tender years. 
The case of Missouri Pacific Rai:Zroad Co. v. Lester, 
242 S.W. (2d) 71± cited by appellant involved a child ·5 
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years of age who ,,~as injured by a fire which the defend-
ant's e1nployees had built in an alley and later abandoned. 
The defendant's employees knew that the minor plaintiff 
"~as around the fire when they left. This case is certainly 
not in point. 
The case of J( entucky Uti~Zities Co. v. Earles A_d-
'Jni£nistrator, 2~ S.W. (2d) 929, cited by appellant is defi-
nitely against the proposition claimed by the appellant. 
In that case a boy 5 months beyond his 14th birthday \vas 
killed vvhen he came in contact with a power line 48 feet 
above the ground on the power company's pole. The court 
held that the boy was a trespasser and that the adminis-
trator could not recover for wilful death on the theory 
of attractive nuisance because that doctrine did not a p-
ply to a boy who had attained his 14th birthday even 
".-here there was evidence that the boy's school grades 
1night have been below norn1al, that he had been compelled 
to take the 4th grade over, and that he 'vas in the 8th 
grade at school. 
POIN'T IV. 
THE ACCIDENT AS A MATTER OF LAW WAS PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED BY THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
AND CARELESSNESS OF THE PLAINTIFF MINOR. 
As previously indicated in con~ection with our dis-
cussion under point III (d), to which reference is hereby 
made, the plaintiff minor was not a child of tender years. 
He vvas in fact 14 years of age. A review of his deposi-
tion shows him to be a normal, intelligent individual. 
Furthermore his deposition conclusively indicates that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
after he trespassed upon the premises of Thomas B. Child 
and eventually came in contact with the drum, that he 
thought it might be dangerous, but, nonetheless and not-
withstanding such knowledge, he lit a match to it and had 
previously lit a fire and torch around it with full knowl-
edge and appreciation of the danger of so doing. His own 
testimony shows that he appreciated the danger, but, 
nonetheless, took an affirmative act in lighting a 1natch, 
a torch and a fire and thereby through his O\Yn act, done 
with knowledge of the possible dangerous consequences, 
brought about his own injury. He was therefore guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of la\Y which 
should preclude his recovery. 
POINT V. 
THE PLAINTIFF MINOR WAS A TRESPASSER AS TO 
WHOM THE DEFENDANTS OWED NO DUTY EX·CEPT AS 
NOT 'TO WILFULLY CAUSE ANY INJURY. 
As a matter of la\\'" the evidence disclosed that the 
plaintiff minor was not an invitee or licensee, but a tres-
passer upon the premises of Thomas B. Child at the 
time of the accident. Under such circumstances there 
• 
was no duty upon the part of the defendants \\'"hatsoever 
to the plaintiff except to refrain fro1n \vilfully injuring 
the plaintiff. There is no evidence in this case \vhatso-
ever that the defendants "\\rilfully caused any injury to 
the plaintiff. 
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CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff minor clearly "'\vas a trespasser upon the 
premises. He knew that he was doing wrong when he 
entered the premises. He thought the drum might contain 
a dangerous substance, but nonetheless lit a match there-
to. There '"ere no markings on the Sealtex to indicate 
it \Vas dangerous, explosive or flammable. There was 
nothing in the experience of the defendants Alder and 
Child to indicate any danger. In factJ it was all to the 
contrary. To hold the defendants liable in a case of this 
type is to make them insurers against injury from any-
body 'vho may come upon their premises and start or 
light fires. This "'\vould extend the liability of the defend-
ants beyond all reason. In this day and age many prod-
ucts are stored in garages and upon pre1nises which are 
not marked dangerous, explosive or flammable. If the 
O"\vner is to be charged with knowledge of the chemical 
contents of such products and to be charged with notice 
that some child may enter his premises and attempt to 
set fire or light matches to such articles, we then submit 
that the owner of the premises becornes an absolute guar-
antor and must at his peril know the chemical analysis of 
any product stored or kept upon his premises and must 
at his peril ascertain whether such product may cause 
injury to someone who may come upon his premises and 
make an unusual or extraordinary use of said article. 
We sub1nit that the defendants did not store a dan-
gerous or explosive product upon the premises; that if 
there was any danger, it was not lmown to the defendants. 
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It was only in connection with the action taken by the 
plaintiff minor in lighting a match and building a fire 
that the accident occurred. Such action could not reason-
ably have been foreseen by the defendants. The motion 
of the defendants Alder and Child for summary judgment 
was properly granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH & STRONG 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents Alder Child 
Construction Company 
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